Is communicating anger or threats more effective in eliciting concessions in negotiation? Recent research has emphasized the effectiveness of anger communication, an emotional strategy. In this article, we argue that anger communication conveys an implied threat, and we document that issuing threats is a more effective negotiation strategy than communicating anger. In 3 computer-mediated negotiation experiments, participants received either angry or threatening messages from a simulated counterpart. Experiment 1 showed that perceptions of threat mediated the effect of anger (vs. a control) on concessions. Experiment 2 showed that (a) threat communication elicited greater concessions than anger communication and (b) poise (being confident and in control of one’s own feelings and decisions) ascribed to the counterpart mediated the positive effect of threat compared to anger on concessions. Experiment 3 replicated this positive effect of threat over anger when recipients had an attractive alternative to a negotiated agreement. These findings qualify previous research on anger communication in negotiation.

Keywords: anger, negotiation, conflict, threat, emotion communication

The use of anger and the use of threats are two common strategies in negotiation (e.g., Barry, 1999). Anecdotes suggest that both are effective. For example, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was persuasive because of his ability to communicate anger, according to French President Charles De Gaulle (De Gaulle, 1954/1964, pp. 57–58). U.S. President John F. Kennedy used threats effectively during the Cuban Missile Crisis, declaring an ultimatum to the Soviets while appearing poised in a televised address on October 22, 1962 (Schlesinger, 1965, pp. 832–840). Although anger and threats may both seem effective strategies in negotiation, it is not clear whether the more emotional strategy or the colder strategy is more effective. In this article, we examine this question: Is communicating anger or threats more effective in eliciting concessions in negotiation? In doing so, we bridge two streams in negotiation and conflict research that evolved independently: recent research on emotions and classic literature on threats.

Anger Communication in Negotiation

Affect in general (e.g., Elfenbein, 2007; Forgas & George, 2001) and emotional communication in particular (Barry, 2008) have become important areas in negotiation research. Of the various emotions that may be communicated in negotiations, anger is one of the most prominent (Allred, 1999; Barry, 1999; Daly, 1991; Van Kleef, Van Dijk, Steinel, Harinck, & Van Beest, 2008). Drawing on the idea that emotional communication can be strategic (Barry, 1999; Clark, Pataki, & Carver, 1996; Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006; Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, 1999), recent research has investigated the effectiveness of anger communication in negotiation. It has found that communicating anger (compared to a control condition or to communicating happiness) can be an effective strategy in eliciting concessions from a counterpart in negotiation (e.g., Sinaeur & Tiedens, 2006; Steinel, Van Kleef, & Harinck, 2008; Van Kleef & Côé, 2007; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a, 2004b, 2010).
Implicit in this positive effect of anger communication (vs. a control) on concessions is the idea that anger conveys the threat of an impasse or other detrimental consequences. For example, the communication of anger was found to be effective because negotiators use the emotion as information to appraise the counterpart’s limit, inferring that a counterpart who communicates anger is close to impasse (Van Kleef et al., 2004a); thus, communicating anger in negotiation acts as a “signal that an impasse is particularly likely” (Van Kleef & Côté, 2007, p. 1558). Consistent with this notion, communicating anger is effective only when the recipients of that communication have poor alternatives to the negotiation and therefore have a lot to lose in case of an impasse (Sinaãœur & Tiedens, 2006). Similarly, the communication of anger induces recipients to make a conciliatory offer only when the costs associated with rejection of the offer are high (Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008).

These findings are in line with arguments that the communication of anger has a deterrent effect on recipients in negotiations (Daly, 1991; Morris & Keltner, 2000). Anger “indicates potential ‘deal breakers’” (Morris & Keltner, 2000, p. 29); it communicates that “negative consequences (such as an impasse) may ensue” (Daly, 1991, p. 36). Hence, anger “conveys threatening messages” (Friedman et al., 2004, p. 370). Anger thus serves the social function of conveying a threat (Averill, 1982). At a basic level, emotion theorists have argued that anger generally signifies a threat to the recipients of that emotional expression (Aronoff, Woike, & Hyman, 1992; Goos & Silverman, 2002; Knutson, 1996; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Marsh, Ambady, & Kleck, 2005). Indeed, it has been found that anger appears intimidating to recipients (Clark et al., 1996). On the basis of these arguments that one primary social function of anger is to convey a threat, we predict the following:

**Hypothesis 1:** Perceptions of threat conveyed by anger mediate the positive effect of anger communication (vs. a control) on concessions in negotiation.

If anger indeed poses a threat, the question arises as to whether it is the emotional communication of anger per se or the implied threat conveyed by the anger that makes recipients concede. If anger were effective because of the threat it implicitly contains, then a direct threat may be even more effective in eliciting concessions. When we make a direct comparison of the effects of anger and threat rather than between anger and a control condition (the latter being the focus of past research), we can better disentangle the effects of anger from threat on concessions. In sum, although anger is more effective than a control comparison point, it may not be more effective than a direct threat.

**The Role of Threats**

A threat may be defined as a conditional statement, usually of the form “if . . . then,” that mentions a negative consequence associated with not complying, for example, “If you don’t make further effort, we won’t reach any deal. Take it or leave it” (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; De Dreu, 1995; Lylle, Brett, & Shapiro, 1999; Pruitt, 1981; Rubin & Brown, 1975; Schelling, 1960). As Pruitt (1981, p. 77) proposed, “a threat is a communication of intent to punish the other if the other fails to concede. Communicating a threat is often an effective strategy to elicit concessions in conflict and negotiation (e.g., Faley & Tedeschi, 1971; Michener & Cohen, 1973; Pruitt, 1981; Rubin & Brown, 1975; Sinaãœur & Neale, 2005; Tedeschi & Bonoma, 1977).

Although a threat may be accompanied by anger (Frank, 1988; Morris & Keltner, 2000), it need not be. A threat may be delivered in a cool, nonemotional way, resulting from the threatener’s careful consideration of his or her options (Galinsky & Liljenquist, 2004; Schelling, 1960). Indeed, qualitative observation of negotiations suggests that ultimatums can be presented in a matter-of-fact way (Kwon & Weingart, 2004, p. 272). Similarly, prior research has suggested that negotiators can make intimidating statements (such as threats) without necessarily being viewed as attacking (Lytle et al., 1999, p. 35). Hence, despite threats and anger being often associated with one another (Pruitt, 1981; Tedeschi & Bonoma, 1977), they are distinguishable. In the current research, we thus compared the respective effects of anger and threats on concession making.

**Is Anger or Threat Communication More Effective?**

One important distinction between communicating threats and anger is that threats are associated with a negotiator being perceived as confident and in control (Friedland, 1976). In contrast, emotional expressions such as anger, it has been argued, reflect a lack of poise (Dewey, 1895; Hebb, 1949), particularly in negotiation (Adler, Rosen, & Silverstein, 1998; Jackall, 1988). Typically, anger is positively correlated with impulsiveness (Dahlen, Martin, Ragin, & Kuhlman, 2004; Ramirez & Andreu, 2006), while colder forms of aggression are not (Ramirez & Andreu, 2006). Anger communication connotes less composure (Underwood, Hurley, Johanson, & Mosley, 1999) than nonemotional communication. Thus, it is plausible that compared to hot or emotional anger, a cold or nonemotional threat will be associated with more perceived poise, that is, a greater perceived sense of confidence and control over one’s own feelings and decisions (The Oxford Dictionary of English, Soanes & Stevenson, 2005). Specifically, we hypothesized that counterparts who issue threats would be perceived as having greater poise than those who communicate anger. This hypothesized difference mirrors a classic distinction in social psychology between instrumental, calculated aggression and impulsive, affective aggression (Berkowitz, 1974; 1993). Specifically, when aggression is marked by intense emotions such as anger, it is perceived as more impulsive and less controlled.

In turn, we hypothesized that threats would be more effective than anger communication in eliciting concessions because of the greater poise conveyed by threats. A negotiator lacking poise may be perceived as not in control, not so likely to follow through on his or her words, or not having seriously thought about possible consequences. In particular, compared to instrumental, calculated aggression, impulsive aggression, affective aggression such as anger is associated with less conscious premeditation and less thinking about consequences (Berkowitz, 1974, 1993; Kimble & Perlmuter, 1970). So, compared to a composed, threatening negotiator, an angry negotiator may be less perceived as having premeditated his or her actions and as having anticipated what steps to take if the recipient were not to comply. Thus, recipients are less likely to infer that a posed, threatening counterpart exaggerated his or her actual willingness to follow through on the threat (Bacharach &
The greater poise ascribed to a threatening expresser makes it more likely that the threat will be viewed as informative and real (Friedland, 1976).

Note that we do not argue that poise is sufficient to elicit concessions independent of the negative valence, or toughness, of the strategy used. Poise in more neutral or positive contexts (e.g., poise conveyed by a charismatic or happy negotiator) might not elicit concessions. Rather, we propose that, in the specific context of value-claiming strategies such as anger and threats, which are both seen as tough (De Dreu, 1995; Pruitt, 1981; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Tedeschi & Bonoma, 1977; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010), relatively greater poise characterizes threats in comparison to anger, which elicits relatively larger concessions in that context.

Overall, we predict the following:

**Hypothesis 2:** Threat communication is more effective than anger communication in eliciting concessions in negotiation.

**Hypothesis 3:** The positive effect of threat communication compared to anger communication in eliciting concessions is mediated by poise ascribed to the threatener.

The Present Studies

To disentangle the effects of communicating anger from communicating threat, we conducted one pilot study and three experiments. We conducted the pilot study to investigate whether people can differentiate between anger and threat statements. Then, we conducted three computer-mediated negotiation experiments in which participants received either angry or threatening messages from a simulated counterpart. In Experiment 1, the design included two experimental conditions (anger communication vs. control) to test the idea that anger induces concessions because it conveys an implied threat. Drawing from that, in Experiments 2 and 3, we made a direct comparison of anger to threat. Therefore, in Experiment 1, the comparison was between anger and control (to test that threat underlies the effect of anger), whereas, in Experiments 2 and 3, the comparison was between anger and threat (to test whether a direct threat is more effective than anger). In Experiment 2, the design was a 2 (anger vs. threat communication) × 2 (early vs. late communication) factorial design. We wanted to test for a positive effect of threat over anger at different points in a negotiation because prior research found that people concede late, rather than early, in negotiation (e.g., Moore, 2004; Pruitt & Drews, 1969; Yukl, 1974a). In Experiment 3, the design included two experimental conditions (anger vs. threat communication) in a situation in which recipients had an attractive alternative to the current negotiation. We wanted to replicate the effect of threat over anger in this situation because prior research found that having an attractive alternative can affect negotiators’ reactions to the strategies of the opponent (Komorita & Barnes, 1969; Yukl, 1974b).

Pilot Study

**Phase 1**

Fifty-three undergraduate students, graduate students, and professionals participated in Phase 1 of the pilot study. They were randomly recruited in the street near several urban university campuses. Participants were volunteers participating on the spot, and their educational background, age, and gender were not recorded. In a repeated-measures design, each participant rated a series of 35 negotiation phrases on whether these expressed anger and/or threats.

The phrases intended to communicate anger were taken from previous research on anger in negotiation (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b). For example, phrases were “I’m fed up with this. You need to make real efforts! It really starts to make me annoyed,” “This begins to seriously get on my nerves!”, and “I am very angry with your offer.” The phrases intended to communicate threat(s) were adapted from previous negotiation research on threats (De Dreu, 1995; Shapiro & Bies, 1994; Sinaceur & Neale, 2005). For example, phrases were “If you don’t make real efforts, we will reach no agreement for this negotiation,” and “If you don’t modify your offer, there will be consequences. It is up to you.” Participants were told that the phrases were taken from real-life negotiations.

For each phrase, participants indicated the extent to which they thought it expressed anger and/or a threat. (The item was worded as follows: “For each phrase, indicate the extent to which you think it expresses a threat, and the extent to which you think it expresses anger. Each phrase can express both a threat and anger, express neither a threat nor anger, express a threat only, or express anger only.”) Participants’ perceptions of a phrase expressing anger and/or threats were measured on 9-point scales (1 = little, 9 = much).

Paired-sample t tests for each of the 35 phrases probed whether each phrase communicated more anger, more threat, or similar levels of both. Sixteen phrases were rated as communicating more anger than threats (all ts > 2.06, all ps < .05), 15 phrases were rated as communicating more threats than anger (all ts > 3.08, all ps < .005), and four showed no difference (all ts < 2.00, all ps > .05).

These paired-sample t tests suggested that participants were often able to differentiate between anger and threat phrases. However, to increase confidence in our manipulation of anger versus threat, we selected the five most differentiated anger phrases (all ts > 7.10, all ps < .001) and the five most differentiated threatening phrases (all ts > 9.10, all ps < .001). Then, we combined the most differentiated angry phrases into two longer angry statements. Similarly, we combined the most differentiated threatening phrases into two longer threatening statements. This resulted in two angry statements and two threatening statements of similar length that are displayed in Table 1.

**Phase 2**

Thirty-four undergraduate students participated in Phase 2 of the pilot study. They were selected in exactly the same way as in Phase 1, and their educational background, age, and gender were not recorded. In a repeated-measures design, each participant rated the two angry statements and the two threatening statements that had.

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1 The resulting angry statements were similar to the ones by Van Kleef and his colleagues (2004a), except that they were longer. These were combined with angry statements by Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006) to get angry and threatening statements of similar length.
been created from the results of Phase 1. The instructions and measures were the same as in Phase 1.

Table 1 presents means. Paired-sample t tests for the four statements showed that each statement was rated as intended (all ts > 3.60, all ps < .001). Specifically, the two angry statements were rated as more angry than threatening, and the two threatening statements were rated as more threatening than angry. Thus, this pilot study provides evidence that people can differentiate between anger and threat statements. In Experiments 1–3, we used the statements resulting from the pilot study to manipulate anger versus threat.

Experiment 1

The goal of Experiment 1 was twofold. First, we wanted to test the argument that the effectiveness of anger may lie in the threat implied. Although the idea that anger conveys an implied threat (e.g., of an impasse or other detrimental consequences) is consistent with results from prior research (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a), this relationship and its causal role have not been tested directly. Thus, in Experiment 1, we investigated whether perceptions of threat causally underlie the effect of anger on concessions.

Second, as can be seen in Table 1, the anger statements that resulted from the pilot study included exclamation marks, whereas the threat statements did not. Exclamation marks may indicate different levels of intensity and appropriateness for anger, thus causing different levels of concessions. To alleviate that potential confound of our anger manipulation, Experiment 1 included two versions of the anger statements: the statements that resulted from the pilot study (see Table 1) and the same statements without exclamation marks. To see if there were differences between these two versions of the anger manipulation, we measured perceptions of intensity and appropriateness in addition to examining concessions.

Method

Participants. Thirty-eight master’s and undergraduate students (21 women and 17 men; mean age = 21.18 years, SD = 3.09) participated in the study for compensation (a voucher worth five euros). They were randomly recruited in the street near several urban university campuses. Their educational background was either in literature (60.53%) or social science (39.47%). To account for the heterogeneity of the sample, we controlled for demographics (i.e., educational background, age, and gender) in all analyses. However, not including participant demographics as controls did not change any of the results reported below.

Experimental design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions: anger communication versus control. This was done via a double-blind procedure in which neither the participants nor the experimenter knew to which condition each participant was assigned. We included two versions of the anger manipulation to see if the presence of the exclamation marks in the anger statements (exclamation marks present vs. exclamation marks absent) mattered.

Procedure. For each session, four to six participants were invited to the laboratory. On arrival, participants were seated in separate cubicles in front of a computer. All materials were presented on the computer screen. Participants read that the purpose of the experiment was to study negotiation in a situation in which the parties could not see each other. They were led to believe that they would engage in a computer-mediated negotiation with another participant who was in one of the other cubicles. In reality, the other participant’s behavior was simulated by the computer.

Negotiation task. All participants engaged in a negotiation task that was an adapted version of the one used by Van Kleef and colleagues (Steinel et al., 2008; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b; Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006; see also De Dreu, 1995; De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995). The task captures main characteristics of real-life negotiations. Specifically, there are multiple issues and multiple agreement positions, there is only information about one’s own payoffs, and it contains the typical offer and counteroffer sequence. Participants learned that they would be assigned the role of either the buyer or the seller of a consignment of mobile phones and that their objective was to negotiate the price, the warranty period, and the number of offered models for the phones.

After a short pause, during which the computer supposedly assigned buyer and seller roles, all participants were told that they had randomly been assigned the role of seller. They were then presented with a payoff chart and were told that their objective was to earn as many points as possible. For each of the three negotiation issues there were nine possible agreement positions (Position 1 yielded the maximum number of points; Position 9 yielded the minimum number of points). The payoff table showed the number of points that participants could make depending on the agreement
position reached for each negotiation issue. To ease participants’ computations of point totals, a calculator was available in each cubicle and each negotiation issue was given the same weight in points. Furthermore, participants saw examples of computations of the point totals that they would obtain if they achieved two specific settlements: the best possible settlement for them and the worst possible settlement for them. The payoff table for the counterpart was not shown, and participants were told only that it differed from their own.

To enhance involvement, participants were informed that the points they earned would be converted to lottery tickets after the negotiation. They were told that by earning more points, they would collect more lottery tickets and increase their chance of winning one of the prizes (i.e., MP3 players). To emphasize the mixed-motive nature of the negotiation, participants were told that only those who reached an agreement would participate in the lottery. Thus, there was an incentive to earn as many points as possible as well as an incentive to reach agreement. Participants were then informed that the negotiation would end when an agreement was reached or when time ran out.

Participants also learned that an additional goal of the study was to examine the effects of having versus not having information about the counterpart’s reactions. They read that the computer had randomly determined that they would receive information about the counterpart’s reactions but that the counterpart would not receive information about their reactions. This allowed us to include the counterpart’s anger communication with the counterpart’s reactions, as described below. After a short pause, during which the computer supposedly prepared the negotiation, participants were told that the buyer (i.e., the counterpart) would make a first offer, which they could counter.

The negotiation began with the buyer (the computer) making a first offer. Over six negotiation rounds, the buyer proposed the following levels of agreement for price, warranty, and number of models, respectively: 8–7–8 (Round 1), 8–7–7 (Round 2), 8–6–7 (Round 3), 7–6–7 (Round 4), 7–6–6 (Round 5), and 6–6–6 (Round 6). Prior research has shown that these specific proposals have face validity and are seen as intermediate in cooperativeness and competitiveness (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995). Every time after the simulated counterpart made an offer, the participant responded to the simulated counterpart’s offer by making an offer himself or herself, with the participant going from making an initial offer to making a final offer. A proposal by the participant was accepted if it equaled or exceeded the offer the computer was about to make in the next round. If no agreement were reached after the sixth round, the negotiation was interrupted (cf. De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007).

**Manipulation.**

*Anger communication versus control.* In the angry counterpart condition (N = 19), participants received a message from the alleged buyer disclosing his or her reactions before the last two rounds (i.e., before Round 5 and before Round 6). These two messages contained the manipulation of the buyer’s anger communication. In the control condition (N = 19), participants received no messages about the buyer’s reactions.

*Two versions of the anger manipulation.* There were two versions for the anger manipulation. One version used as the two messages from the buyer (i.e., the computerized counterpart) the two angry statements that resulted from the pilot study and that are presented in Table 1, which included exclamation marks (N = 10). The other version used the same statements but without any exclamation marks (N = 9).

**Dependent measures.**

*Outcome.* The final offer made by participants in the negotiation sequence was the main dependent variable. It was obtained by adding together the levels of each issue in the final proposal: price, warranty, and number of models. Lower (higher) numbered options on these issues were better for participants (for the opponent). Hence, the final offer by participants represented a total concessions index: the higher the final offer, the greater the participants’ concessions (possible range = 3–27, actual range = 8–19). In all analyses on final offers, we controlled for participants’ initial offers (i.e., offers by participants at Round 1, before any manipulation occurred) because research has documented that negotiation outcomes are strongly influenced by initial offers (Adair, Weingart, & Brett, 2007; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007).

*Perception of threat.* Perception of threat was the hypothesized mediator of the effect of anger on concessions. This was measured by having participants rate four items (“Did the counterpart explicitly state a threat against you in the negotiation?”, “Did the behavior of your counterpart implicitly convey a threat?”, “To what extent does the adjective ‘threatening’ describe your counterpart given the reactions he/she sent?”, and “To what extent does the adjective ‘threatening’ describe your counterpart given the reactions he/she sent?”). They were averaged into a single index (Cronbach’s α = .92).

*Perceptions of intensity and appropriateness.* To see if there were differences between the two versions of the anger manipulation, we measured perceptions of intensity and appropriateness. Perception of intensity was measured by having participants rate two items (“Were your counterpart’s reactions intense?” and “Were your counterpart’s reactions extreme?”). They were averaged into a single index (Cronbach’s α = .82). Perception of appropriateness was measured by having participants rate two items (“Were your counterpart’s reactions proper?” and “Were your counterpart’s reactions legitimate?”). They were averaged into a single index (Cronbach’s α = .76).

**Manipulation check.**

*Anger.* To check the effectiveness of the anger communication manipulation, we measured perceptions of anger expressions in the counterpart using three items on 9-point scales (“To what extent did your counterpart express anger in the negotiation?”, “To what extent did your counterpart express irritation in the negotiation?”, and “To what extent did your counterpart express discontent in the negotiation?”). They were averaged into a single index (Cronbach’s α = .95).

**Results.**

As indicated before, we controlled for demographics in all analyses, thus reporting analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) below. However, not including participant demographics as controls did not change any of the results reported below.

**Differences between the two versions of the anger manipulation.** We first examined differences between the two versions of the anger manipulation for all dependent measures to see if the
presence versus absence of exclamation marks mattered. Specifically, we did so for the anger manipulation check, concessions (i.e., final offers), perceptions of threat, perceptions of intensity, and perceptions of appropriateness. There were no differences between the two versions of the anger manipulation (all five $F$s < .24, all five $p$s > .62). On that basis, we collapsed the two versions of the anger condition in subsequent analyses.

**Anger manipulation check.** An ANCOVA (strategy: anger communication vs. control) on the anger manipulation check showed that participants in the anger condition thought that the counterpart expressed more anger ($M = 7.18$, $SD = 1.43$) than control participants ($M = 2.76$, $SD = 2.00$), $F(1, 33) = 62.48$, $p < .0001$, $\eta^2 = .65$.

**Concessions.** We examined the total amount of concessions made by participants, which was operationalized as their final offer. An ANCOVA (strategy: anger communication vs. control) was conducted on final offers, controlling for participants’ initial offers (i.e., offers by participants at round 1, before any manipulation occurred). As expected, there was a main effect for participants’ initial offers, such that participants who made small concessions initially also made small concessions finally, $F(1, 32) = 21.47$, $p < .0001$, $\eta^2 = .40$. Above and beyond that, there was a main effect of strategy, such that participants made larger concessions to an angry counterpart ($M = 15.02$, $SD = 2.70$) than to a control counterpart ($M = 13.14$, $SD = 2.89$), $F(1, 32) = 6.47$, $p < .02$, $\eta^2 = .17$. This positive effect of anger communication in eliciting concessions replicates prior work.

**Perceived threat implied by anger.** We argued that recipients would perceive an angry counterpart as conveying a threat. An ANCOVA (strategy: anger communication vs. control) on perceived threat showed that, indeed, an angry counterpart was perceived as threatening ($M = 5.19$, $SD = 1.68$) compared to a control counterpart ($M = 1.65$, $SD = 1.29$), $F(1, 33) = 52.47$, $p < .0001$, $\eta^2 = .61$.

**Mediation analysis.** Next, we examined whether perceived threat mediated the positive effect of anger on concessions. We followed the approach of Baron and Kenny (1986), controlling for participants’ initial offers. The results of the analyses are presented in Figure 1.

First, the anger versus control factor predicted participants’ concessions, $\beta = .34$, $t$(32) = 2.54, $p < .02$, such that anger elicited larger concessions. Second, the anger versus control factor also predicted participants’ perception of threat, $\beta = .79$, $t$(33) = 7.24, $p < .0001$, such that an angry counterpart was perceived as more threatening. Third, participants’ perception of threat was associated with larger concessions, $\beta = .50$, $t$(32) = 4.32, $p < .0002$. Fourth, a regression on concessions was conducted with the anger versus control factor and participants’ perception of threat as simultaneous predictors. In this regression, the effect of the anger versus control factor was no longer significant, $\beta = -.12$, $t$(31) = −0.67, $p > .50$, whereas the effect of participants’ perception of threat remained significant, $\beta = .59$, $t$(31) = 3.23, $p < .003$. To test the significance of the indirect effect (i.e., the path through the mediator), we followed a bootstrapping procedure (Preacher & Hayes, 2008, 2009), as recommended by Shrout and Bolger (2002). We used Preacher and Hayes’s (2008, 2009) multiple mediation model because it allows one to include covariates (but using their simple mediation model yielded similar results). The result of 1,000 resamples demonstrated that zero fell outside of the 95% confidence interval (CI) of the indirect effect (95% CI [1.42, 4.69]). Thus, recipients’ perception of threat mediated the positive effect of anger on concessions.

**Discussion**

Experiment 1 provides direct evidence that anger elicits concessions in negotiations because it conveys a threat (Hypothesis 1). Although this idea has long been suggested by negotiation (e.g., Morris & Keltner, 2000) and emotion (e.g., Marsh et al., 2005) theorists alike, this relationship had not been established by empirical testing. Yet, if anger were effective because of the implied threat, then it is plausible that a direct threat would be even more effective in eliciting concessions than anger because negotiators who display anger are likely to be perceived as lacking poise (compared to negotiators who issue threats) and this perception is likely to decrease recipients’ compliance. Hence, in Experiments 2–3, we made a direct comparison of anger and threat and explored whether a threat would be more effective than anger.

In doing so, we used the angry and threatening statements that resulted from the pilot study (see Table 1). Experiment 1 found no difference between anger with exclamation marks and anger without exclamation marks. Thus, it seemed unlikely that potential differences between our angry and threatening statements were the result of punctuation differences that could cause angry statements to be seen as more intense and inappropriate. We returned to this issue in Experiment 3.

**Experiment 2**

The goal of Experiment 2 was to directly compare the effects of anger and threat on concession making in negotiation. As elaborated earlier, we predicted that threats would be more effective than anger (Hypothesis 2) and that this relative effect would be mediated by perceived poise (Hypothesis 3).

In addition, we examined the role of timing in a more exploratory fashion. Prior research has shown that timing affects concessions in negotiation. Specifically, negotiators make more concessions late rather than early in the negotiation (Benton, Kelley, & Liebling, 1972; Moore, 2004; Pruitt & Drews, 1969; Yukl, 1974a). This timing effect has led scholars to propose that the threat of an impasse looms larger (Pruitt, 1981) and that communicating threats could be more effective (Schelling, 1960) late rather than early in negotiation. Empirical evidence also supports the notion that the timing of a threat is important: late explicit threats were found to elicit more concessions than early explicit threats (Sinaceur & Neale, 2005). We therefore included a timing manipulation in our design to
explore whether anger and threats are more effective when issued later rather than earlier in a negotiation and to insure that the predicted positive effect of threats over anger holds above and beyond this timing effect.

Method

Participants. Two-hundred and seven master’s and undergraduate students (109 women and 98 men; mean age = 21.12 years, SD = 2.76) participated in the study for compensation (a voucher worth five euros). They were randomly recruited in the street near several urban university campuses. Their educational backgrounds were broad, including areas such as medicine, financial management, economics, literature, history, and law. We coded educational background as either emphasizing quantitative skills (e.g., medicine) or not (e.g., literature). To account for the heterogeneity of the sample, we controlled for demographics (i.e., educational background, age, and gender) in all analyses. However, not including participant demographics as controls did not change any of the results reported below.

Experimental design. The experimental design was a 2 (strategy: anger vs. threat communication) × 2 (timing: early vs. late communication) factorial, between-subject design. Participants were randomly assigned to experimental conditions according to a double-blind procedure in which neither the participants nor the experimenter knew to which condition each participant was assigned.

Procedure. The procedure was identical to the one used in Experiment 1. Again, participants negotiated with a simulated counterpart in a sequence of six rounds.

Manipulations.

Anger versus threat communication. Before two successive rounds (the timing manipulation below indicates which rounds) out of the six negotiation rounds, participants received a message from the buyer (i.e., the computerized counterpart) disclosing his or her reactions. These messages contained the manipulation of the buyer’s anger versus threat communication. For the manipulation, we used the two angry statements and the two threatening statements that resulted from the pilot study (see Table 1). In the angry counterpart condition (N = 104), participants received the two angry statements as messages from the counterpart before two successive rounds. In the threatening counterpart condition (N = 102), participants received the two threatening statements as messages from the counterpart before two successive rounds.

Timing. In the early condition (N = 107), participants received the messages from the alleged buyer, which contained the anger or threat statements, before Round 2 and before Round 3 in the negotiation sequence. In the late condition (N = 99), participants received the same messages before Round 5 and before Round 6 in the negotiation sequence. This manipulation of timing is consistent with that of prior research (e.g., Pruitt & Drews, 1969; Yukl, 1974a).

Dependent measures.

Outcome. As in Experiment 1, the final offer by participants represented the total amount of concessions they made across the three negotiation issues (possible range = 3–27, actual range = 3–22).

Perception of poise. Perception of poise between threat and anger was the hypothesized mediator. This was measured by having participants rate five items, based on the definition of poise as perceived sense of confidence and control (The Oxford Dictionary of English, Soanes & Stevenson, 2005; “To what extent does the adjective ‘self-confident’ describe your counterpart given the reactions he/she sent?” “Did you think that your counterpart had control of his/her emotions?”, “Did you think that your counterpart was sure of his/her decisions?”, “Did your counterpart seem to lose his/her grip during the negotiation?” [reverse scored], and “Did your counterpart seem to control his/her emotions?”, 1 = little, 9 = very much), which were averaged into a single index (Cronbach’s α = .72). A confirmatory factor analysis verified that these items loaded on one factor (it yielded only one factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1, i.e., 2.39, which explained 47.77% of the total variance; also, all items loaded positively on that factor, with all factor loading > .57).

Manipulation checks.

Anger. To check the effectiveness of the anger communication manipulation, we measured perceptions of anger expressions in the counterpart using the same three items as in Experiment 1. These were averaged into a single index (Cronbach’s α = .80).

Threat. To check the effectiveness of the threat communication manipulation, we measured perceptions of threats communicated by the counterpart using two items on 9-point scales (“Did the counterpart explicitly state a threat against you in the negotiation?” and “Did the counterpart explicitly threaten to take steps against you?”; 0 = not at all, 8 = very much). These were averaged into a single index (Cronbach’s α = .86). To further probe the threat and anger manipulations, we added a dichotomous item about perceptions of cold versus more emotional threats (“If you answered 1 or more to the prior question, did the counterpart express his/her threats in a cold way or in an emotional way?”), which could be answered by either “In a cold way” or “In an emotional way.”

Timing. To check the effectiveness of the timing manipulation, we used dichotomous items for anger (“If you think the counterpart expressed anger during the negotiation, when did he or she express anger?”) and for threat (“If you think the counterpart explicitly stated a threat, when did he or she state a threat?”). These could be answered by either “Start of the negotiation” or “End of the negotiation.”

Results

As indicated before, we controlled for demographics in all analyses, thus reporting ANCOVAs below. However, not including participant demographics as controls did not change any of the results reported below.

Manipulation checks.

Anger. A 2 (strategy: anger vs. threat communication) × 2 (timing: early vs. late communication) ANCOVA on the anger manipulation check showed that participants in the anger condition thought that the counterpart expressed more anger (M = 7.60, SD = 1.85) than participants in the threat condition (M = 5.81, SD = 1.86), F(1, 200) = 47.58, p < .001, η² = .19. There were no main or interaction effects due to timing.

One participant made an initial offer that exceeded the offer by the computer in round 2, so her negotiation ended before any manipulation and she could not be included in the analyses.
Threat. A 2 (strategy: anger vs. threat communication) × 2 (timing: early vs. late communication) ANCOVA on the threat manipulation check showed that participants in the threat condition thought that the counterpart communicated more threats (M = 4.80, SD = 2.61) than participants in the anger condition (M = 2.99, SD = 2.60), F(1, 200) = 24.74, p < .001, η² = .11. There were no main or interaction effects due to timing.

In addition, we conducted a logistic regression on the dichotomous check about perceptions of cold versus emotional threats with the anger versus threat factor, the timing factor, and their interaction as predictors (all participants were asked to answer this check). This indicated that participants in the threat condition found their counterpart’s threats to be cold rather than emotional compared to participants in the anger condition, B = 1.86, Wald(1) = 15.66, Ex(B) = 0.16, p < .001. There were no main or interaction effects due to timing.

Timing. A logistic regression on the timing of anger manipulation check with the anger versus threat factor, the timing factor, and their interaction as predictors indicated that participants in the early condition thought that anger, if any, had been expressed earlier rather than later compared to participants in the late condition, B = 4.69, Wald(1) = 29.64, Ex(B) = 109.24, p < .001. There were no other effects. A similar logistic regression on the timing of threat manipulation check indicated that participants in the early condition thought that threats, if any, had been expressed earlier rather than later compared to participants in the late condition, B = 4.00, Wald(1) = 36.74, Ex(B) = 54.41, p < .001.3

Concessions. We examined the total amount of concessions made by participants. A 2 (strategy: anger vs. threat communication) × 2 (timing: early vs. late communication) ANCOVA was conducted on final offers, controlling for participants’ initial offers as in Experiment 1. The means are displayed in Figure 2. As was also the case in Experiment 1, there was a main effect for participants’ initial offers, F(1, 198) = 93.89, p < .001, η² = .32. Above and beyond that, there was a main effect of strategy, such that participants made larger concessions to a threatening counterpart (M = 15.03, SD = 2.77) than to an angry counterpart (M = 13.98, SD = 2.76), F(1, 198) = 7.18, p < .05, η² = .04. This positive effect of threat over anger communication in eliciting concessions supports Hypothesis 2. Consistent with prior research, there was also a main effect of timing, as participants made larger concessions to a counterpart using strategies late (M = 14.89, SD = 2.75) than to a counterpart using strategies early (M = 14.12, SD = 2.75), F(1, 198) = 3.92, p < .05, η² = .02, in the negotiation. No interaction qualified the strategy and timing effects, F(1, 198) = .005, ns.

Perceived poise. We hypothesized that recipients would perceive a threatening counterpart to be more poise than an angry counterpart. A 2 (strategy: anger vs. threat communication) × 2 (timing: early vs. late communication) ANCOVA on perceived poise showed that participants ascribed more poise to a threatening counterpart (M = 3.36, SD = 1.52) than to an angry counterpart (M = 2.60, SD = 1.52), F(1, 200) = 12.73, p < .001, η² = .06. There were no main or interaction effects due to timing on perceived poise.

Mediation analysis. Next, we examined whether recipients’ perception of the counterpart’s poise mediated the positive effect of threat over anger in eliciting concessions. We followed the approach of Baron and Kenny (1986), controlling for participants’ initial offers and including the timing factor (and its interaction term) in all regressions. The results of the analyses are presented in Figure 3.

First, the anger versus threat factor predicted participants’ concessions, β = .15, t(198) = 2.69, p < .05, such that threats elicited more concessions than anger. Second, the anger versus threat factor also predicted participants’ perception of the counterpart’s poise, β = .24, t(200) = 3.53, p < .001, such that participants ascribed more poise to a threatening counterpart than to an angry counterpart. Third, perceived poise was associated with larger concessions, β = .18, t(200) = 3.24, p < .002. Fourth, a regression on concessions was conducted with the anger versus threat factor and participants’ perception of the counterpart’s poise as simultaneous predictors. In this regression, the effect of the anger versus threat factor was reduced, β = .11, t(197) = 2.01, p = .045, whereas the effect of participants’ perception of the counterpart’s poise remained significant, β = .15, t(197) = 2.70, p = .007. To test the significance of the indirect effect (i.e., the path through the mediator), we followed a bootstrapping procedure (Preacher & Hayes, 2008, 2009). The result of 1,000 resamples demonstrated that zero fell outside of the 95% CI of the indirect effect of perceived poise (95% CI [0.09, 0.57]). Thus, recipients’ perception of the counterpart’s poise partially mediated the positive effect of threat over anger, supporting Hypothesis 3.

Discussion

Experiment 2 provides evidence that communicating threats is a more effective strategy than communicating anger. Specifically, participants made more concessions to a counterpart communicating threats than to a counterpart communicating anger (Hypothesis

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3 There was a marginal effect for the interaction, B = 1.71, Wald(1) = 3.70, Ex(B) = 0.18, p = .054, such that participants in the anger condition (who did not receive threat communications) had more difficulty discriminating between early and late threat compared to participants in the threat condition, as all participants were asked to answer the timing checks and a nonapplicable choice was not offered.
2). Also, timing mattered such that value-claiming strategies (i.e., communicating threat or anger) were generally more effective later rather than earlier in the negotiation. This timing effect is consistent with prior literature on negotiation (Moore, 2004; Pruitt, 1981; Sinaceur & Neale, 2005; Yukl, 1974a and other social interactions (Frantz & Bennigson, 2005). Yet the positive effect of threat over anger held above and beyond this timing effect. Furthermore, Experiment 2 tested the proposed mechanism and showed that recipients’ perception of the counterpart’s poise mediated the positive effect of threat versus anger on concessions (Hypothesis 3).

One shortcoming of Experiment 2 is that participants did not have an alternative to the negotiation, so they may have perceived strong pressure to reach an agreement. Alternatives to the negotiation are an important source of power in negotiation and are therefore highly relevant to how much a negotiator concedes (Mannix, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989; Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994; White, Valley, Bazerman, Neale, & Peck, 1994; Wolfe & McGinn, 2005). Thus, the fact that participants did not have an alternative potentially limits our contribution. Would the positive effect of threats over anger extend to a situation in which participants have an attractive alternative to the negotiation?

On the one hand, recipients who have an attractive alternative to the negotiation have little motivation to pay attention to or to react to the counterpart’s displays of emotions, especially the counterpart’s displays of anger. Having an attractive alternative is related to low epistemic motivation (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 1994; White, Valley, Bazerman, Neale, & Peck, 1994; Wolfe & McGinn, 2005). Thus, the fact that participants did not have an alternative potentially limits our contribution. Would the positive effect of threats over anger extend to a situation in which participants have an attractive alternative to the negotiation?

On the one hand, recipients who have an attractive alternative to the negotiation have little motivation to pay attention to or to react to the counterpart’s displays of emotions, especially the counterpart’s displays of anger. Having an attractive alternative is related to low epistemic motivation (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 2004b and less experienced dependency (e.g., Van Kleef & Côté, 2007) toward another’s emotions in negotiation. In turn, the positive effect of an opponent’s anger on recipients’ concession making is reduced (as compared to happiness or neutral emotion; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007; Van Kleef et al., 2004b, 2006) when recipients have an attractive alternative. Thus, it is possible that anger would be less effective than threats in this case.

On the other hand, having an attractive alternative makes a negotiator generally less susceptible to the tactics of the opponent (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Komorita & Barnes, 1969; Yukl, 1974b). In particular, recipients who have an attractive alternative are less affected by tough moves from the counterpart (Komorita & Barnes, 1969), which might include the communication of anger as well as the communication of threats. Hence, it is theoretically possible that the effects of threats would not differ from those of anger when recipients have an attractive alternative. On the basis of this latter argument, we thought that it was important to replicate the difference between anger and threats when recipients have an attractive alternative. We conducted Experiment 3 with that goal in mind, giving all participants an attractive alternative to the negotiation.

**Experiment 3**

The main goal of Experiment 3 was to compare the effects of anger and threats on concession making when recipients had an attractive alternative to the negotiation—a source of power in negotiation (e.g., Pinkley et al., 1994). Thus, in Experiment 3, we gave all participants an attractive alternative to the negotiation and examined the resulting effects of anger versus threats on participants’ concessions. Another goal of Experiment 3 was to rule out two possible alternative explanations for the difference between anger and threats. In Experiment 1, we measured perceptions of intensity and appropriateness and found that these were not affected by the presence versus absence of exclamation marks in the angry statements. However, it is still possible that, in comparison to threats, anger might be seen as overly intense and/or more inappropriate, and that these perceptions drive the positive effect of threats over anger. Thus, in Experiment 3, we again measured perceptions of intensity and appropriateness and examined whether either mediated our hypothesized effect.

**Method**

**Participants.** Fifty-eight master’s and undergraduate students (26 women and 32 men; mean age = 21.14 years, SD = 2.30) participated in the study for compensation (a voucher worth five euros). They were recruited in the same manner as in prior experiments. Their educational background was diverse and was coded as either emphasizing quantitative skills (e.g., economics) or not (e.g., history). As before, we controlled for demographics (i.e., educational background, age, and gender) in all analyses, thus reporting ANCOVAs below. However, not including participant demographics as controls did not change any of the results reported below.

**Experimental design.** Participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions: anger communication (N = 33) versus threat communication (N = 25). Assignment to conditions occurred via a double-blind procedure.

**Procedure.** The procedure was identical to the one used in Experiments 1 and 2, with two exceptions. First, participants negotiated over four rounds rather than six. Thus, over the four negotiation rounds, the buyer (i.e., the computer) proposed the following levels of agreement for price, warranty, and number of models, respectively: 8–7–8 (Round 1), 8–7–7 (Round 2), 8–6–7 (Round 3), and 7–6–7 (Round 4). As indicated before, prior research has shown that these specific proposals are seen as intermediate in cooperativeness and competitiveness (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995).

Second, all participants were given an attractive alternative to the negotiation (whereas no information about alternatives had been given before). In this study, the alternative to the negotiation was set at 16 for all participants, an outcome that was clearly better than the last offer made by the computer in Round 4 or the last round of the negotiation (the lower the offer, the better it was for participants). Thus, all participants read in their instructions prior to the negotiation that they had another offer that was worth 16. Specifically, they were told that they had
already received an offer from another, important buyer for the same consignment of mobile phones, which was worth 16. They were told they could end the negotiation with their current counterpart at any time and accept their valuable alternative (e.g., Pinkley et al., 1994). They were reminded of these instructions right before starting the negotiation.

**Manipulations.** The statements for the manipulations were identical to those in Experiment 2. Participants received these statements before Round 3 and before Round 4, which were now the later rounds.

**Dependent measures.**  
**Outcome.** As before, the final offer by participants represented the total of concessions they made across the three negotiation issues (possible range = 3–27, actual range = 9–16).

**Perception of poise.** We measured perception of poise using a combination of items used in Experiment 2 and some new items to ensure that our mediation was not limited to one particular set of items. Three items were the same as in Experiment 2 (i.e., “To what extent does the adjective ‘self-confident’ describe your counterpart given the reactions he/she sent?”), “Did you think that your counterpart was sure of his/her decisions?”; and “Did your counterpart seem to lose his/her grip during the negotiation?” [reverse scored]; 1 = little, 9 = very much), and two items were new (i.e., “To what extent did your counterpart have a good head on his/her shoulders given the reactions he/she sent?” and “Did the counterpart seem to carefully weigh his/her decisions?”; 1 = little, 9 = very much). These five items were averaged into a single index (Cronbach’s α = .74). A confirmatory factor analysis verified that these items loaded on one factor (it yielded only one factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1, i.e., 2.47, which explained 49.41% of the total variance; also, all items loaded positively on that factor with all factor loading ls > .60).

**Perceptions of intensity and inappropriateness.** We also wanted to rule out perceptions of intensity and inappropriateness as potential alternative explanations associated with our anger versus threats manipulations. Perception of intensity was measured using two items (“Were your counterpart’s reactions intense?” and “Were your counterpart’s reactions exaggerated?”; 1 = little, 9 = very much), which were averaged into a single index (Cronbach’s α = .73). Perception of inappropriateness was measured using two items (“Were your counterpart’s reactions inappropriate?” and “Were your counterpart’s reactions rude?”; 1 = little, 9 = very much), which were averaged into a single index (Cronbach’s α = .82).

**Checks.**

**Bargaining power.** To check that our alternative instructions elicited a good bargaining power perception, we measured participants’ perception of their bargaining power using a dichotomous item (“At the start of the negotiation, did you think that you were in a good bargaining position or in a bad bargaining position facing the counterpart?”), which could be answered by either “In a good bargaining position” or “In a bad bargaining position.”

**Anger and threat.** The manipulation checks for anger communication (α = .87), for threat communication (α = .86), and for perceptions of cold versus more emotional threats were the same as in Experiment 2.

### Results

**Checks.**

**Bargaining power.** We first checked that most participants thought they were in a good bargaining position. Indeed, 47 participants (81%) thought they were so, which was significantly greater than chance, χ²(1, N = 58) = 22.34, p < .0001. We report below results with all participants throughout all analyses. However, it is important to note that not including the 11 participants (19%) who failed the bargaining power check did not change any of the results reported below.

**Anger.** An ANCOVA (strategy: anger vs. threat communication) on the anger manipulation check showed that participants in the anger condition thought that the counterpart expressed more anger (M = 8.34, SD = 0.76) than did participants in the threat condition (M = 6.26, SD = 1.76), F(1, 53) = 42.08, p < .0001, η² = .44.

**Threat.** An ANCOVA (strategy: anger vs. threat communication) on the threat manipulation check showed that participants in the threat condition thought that the counterpart expressed more threats (M = 4.37, SD = 2.15) than did participants in the anger condition (M = 2.61, SD = 2.54), F(1, 53) = 7.57, p < .01, η² = .12. In addition, we conducted a logistic regression on the dichotomous check about perceptions of cold versus emotional threats with the anger versus threat difference as a factor. This indicated that participants in the threat condition found their counterpart’s threats to be cold rather than emotional compared to participants in the anger condition, B = 2.54, Wald(1) = 14.01, Ex(B) = 12.68, p < .0005.

**Concessions.** Next, we examined concessions by participants. An ANCOVA (strategy: anger vs. threat communication) was conducted on final offers, controlling for participants’ initial offers as before. The means are displayed in Figure 4. As expected, there was a main effect for participants’ initial offers, F(1, 52) = 16.98, p < .001, η² = .25. Above and beyond that, there was a main effect of strategy, such that participants made larger concessions to a threatening counterpart (M = 15.10, SD = 1.12) than to

![Figure 4](image-url)  
**Figure 4.** Experiment 3: Total of concessions made by participants when participants were given an attractive alternative. All participants were given an attractive alternative to the negotiation. A higher score indicates larger concessions.
an angry counterpart ($M = 14.29$, $SD = 1.57$), $F(1, 52) = 5.97$, $p < .02$, $\eta^2 = .10$. This latter result is consistent with the main result from Experiment 2, yet it extends this to a situation when participants were given an attractive alternative to the negotiation.

**Perceived poise.** We argued that recipients would perceive a threatening counterpart to be more poised than an angry counterpart. An ANCOVA (strategy: anger vs. threat communication) was conducted on perceived poise. It showed that participants ascribed more poise to a threatening counterpart ($M = 4.08$, $SD = 0.83$) than to an angry counterpart ($M = 2.57$, $SD = 1.61$), $F(1, 53) = 19.23$, $p < .0001$, $\eta^2 = .27$.

**Mediation by perceived poise.** Then, we examined whether recipients’ perception of the counterpart’s poise mediated the positive effect of threat over anger in eliciting concessions. We followed the approach of Baron and Kenny (1986), controlling for participants’ initial offers as in Experiments 1 and 2. The results of the analyses are presented in Figure 5.

First, the anger versus threat factor predicted participants’ concessions, $\beta = .28$, $t(52) = 2.44$, $p < .02$, such that threats elicited more concessions than anger. Second, the anger versus threat factor also predicted participants’ perception of the counterpart’s poise, $\beta = .50$, $t(53) = 4.39$, $p < .0001$, such that participants ascribed more poise to a threatening counterpart than to an angry counterpart. Third, perceived poise was associated with larger concessions, $\beta = .38$, $t(52) = 3.30$, $p < .002$. Fourth, a regression on concessions was conducted with the anger versus threat factor and participants’ perception of the counterpart’s poise as simultaneous predictors. In this regression, the effect of the anger versus threat factor was no longer significant, $\beta = .13$, $t(51) = 0.97$, $p > .33$, whereas the effect of participants’ perception of the counterpart’s poise remained significant, $\beta = .31$, $t(51) = 2.31$, $p = .025$. To test the significance of the indirect effect (i.e., the path through the mediator), we followed a bootstrapping procedure (Preacher & Hayes, 2008, 2009). The result of 1,000 resamples demonstrated that zero fell outside of the 95% CI of the indirect effect of perceived poise. Thus, recipients’ perception of the counterpart’s poise mediated the positive effect of threats compared to anger.

**Perception of intensity.** Next, we examined whether perception of intensity mediated the positive effect of threat over anger in eliciting concessions. First, an ANCOVA showed that participants in the threat condition found their counterpart’s reactions to be marginally less intense ($M = 6.41$, $SD = 1.44$) than did participants in the anger condition ($M = 7.10$, $SD = 1.89$), $F(1, 53) = 2.42$, $p = .13$, $\eta^2 = .04$. Also, when a regression on concessions was conducted with the anger versus threat factor and perception of intensity as simultaneous predictors, the effect of the anger versus threat factor remained significant ($p < .04$), whereas the effect of perception of intensity was not significant ($p > .15$). A bootstrapping procedure using 1,000 resamples demonstrated that the indirect effect of perception of intensity was not significant (95% CI $[-0.37, 0.04]$). Thus, the effect of threats compared to anger was not mediated by perception of intensity.

**Perception of appropriateness.** Finally, we examined whether perception of appropriateness mediated the positive effect of threat over anger in eliciting concessions. First, an ANCOVA showed that participants in the threat condition did not find their counterpart’s reactions to be significantly less inappropriate than did participants in the anger condition, $F(1, 53) = 1.00$, $p > .32$. Also, when a regression on concessions was conducted with the anger versus threat factor and perception of appropriateness as simultaneous predictors, the effect of the anger versus threat factor remained significant ($p = .03$), whereas the effect of perception of appropriateness was marginal ($p < .06$). A bootstrapping procedure using 1,000 resamples demonstrated that the indirect effect of perception of appropriateness was not significant (95% CI $[-0.03, 0.45]$). Thus, the effect of threats compared to anger was not mediated by perception of appropriateness.

**Discussion**

Experiment 3 extended the main result of Experiment 2 to a situation where all participants were given an attractive alternative to a current negotiation. In such a situation, participants again made more concessions to a counterpart communicating threats than to a counterpart communicating anger (Hypothesis 2). Also, again, poise ascribed to the counterpart mediated the positive effect of communicating threats rather than anger in eliciting concessions (Hypothesis 3). Neither perceptions of intensity nor perceptions of appropriateness mediated the positive effect of threat over anger in eliciting concessions.

**General Discussion**

Three studies were conducted to disentangle the effects of communicating anger from communicating threats in negotiations. Prior research has examined either anger or threats but had not examined these strategies in a way to separate out their respective effects on concession making.

Experiment 1 provided evidence that anger communication conveys an implied threat. Specifically, Experiment 1 showed that perceptions of threat mediated the effect of anger (vs. a control) on concessions (Hypothesis 1). This finding supports the (hitherto untested) argument made by both negotiation and emotion theorists that anger conveys an implied threat in social interactions (e.g., Clark et al., 1996; Morris & Keltner, 2000).

Drawing from that, Experiments 2 and 3 made a direct comparison of anger and threat. Both these experiments showed that issuing threats is a more effective negotiation strategy than communicating anger. Across Experiments 2 and 3, (a) participants made more concessions to a counterpart communicating threats than to a counterpart communicating anger (Hypothesis 2), and (b) poise (being confident and in control of one’s own feelings and decisions) ascribed to the counterpart mediated the positive effect of communicating threats rather than anger on concessions (Hypothesis 3).
Experiment 2 also showed that the positive effect of communicating threats compared to anger holds above and beyond the timing of these communications. Specifically, these communications were more effective later rather than earlier in the negotiation, consistent with prior research (e.g., Benton et al., 1972; Moore, 2004). Yet, above and beyond that, threats elicited more concessions than anger. In addition, Experiment 3 extended the main result of Experiment 2 to a situation where all participants were given an attractive alternative to the current negotiation. Thus, Experiment 3 demonstrated that (a) threats are more effective than anger in eliciting concessions and (b) this relative difference is mediated by the greater poise conveyed by threats even when negotiators have an attractive alternative to consider. Finally, Experiments 1 and 3 indicate that our effects cannot be explained in terms of differential perceptions of intensity or appropriateness, thus ruling out important alternative explanations.

Theoretical Implications: Cognitive or Emotional Communication?

Negotiation research has long been characterized by a cognitive perspective (Neale & Bazerman, 1991). Even with the dominant cognitive perspective, scholars were interested in the role of affect in negotiation, focusing mostly on emotional experience (e.g., Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Forgas, 1998; Piliutia & Murmihan, 1996). Recently, researchers have started exploring emotional communication in negotiation (e.g., Barry, 2008; Graham, Huang, Clark, & Helgeson, 2008; Kopelman et al., 2006), particularly anger communication (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Steinel et al., 2008; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b, 2010). Drawing on the idea that emotional communication conveys perceptions—specifically, that recipients ascribe toughness to an angry expresser (Clark et al., 1996; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; see Tiedens, 2001)—these researchers found that communicating anger generally elicits concessions in negotiation. Thus, they highlighted the effectiveness of anger communication as a strategy. However, in all prior studies, the comparison was between anger and relatively softer strategies, such as communicating positive (i.e., happiness) or no emotion (i.e., a control condition). That anger elicited more concessions than softer strategies might be unsurprising because acting tough generally elicits concessions (cf. Pruitt, 1981; Yukl, 1974b). Thus, departing from prior work, the current research is the first to assess the impact of anger by comparing it to another tough, value-based intimidation may differ from attack (Lytle et al., 1999, p. 35). In contrast, threats may not always be associated with perceived aggressiveness (Kwon & Weingart, 2004, p. 272; Lytle et al., 1999, p. 35; Rubin & Brown, 1975, pp. 285–286; Sinaceur & Neale, 2005; Tedeschi & Bonoma, 1977). Along that line, it is plausible that threats convey relatively less aggressiveness than anger. To investigate this speculation, we performed an exploratory examination while conducting Experiment 2 and found that threatening counterparts were viewed as less aggressive, more agreeable, and less coercive than angry counterparts (measured through single items; all ps < .04; we should note, however, that none of these perceptions mediated the positive effect of threats over anger in eliciting concessions; only perceptions of poise did). Hence, threats may not only be more effective but also limit the negative reactions often associated with communicating anger. In sum, threats are more effective than anger because of the greater poise conveyed by threats, and parallel to that, they have the added benefit of being perceived as less coercive.

This, in turn, speaks to how a negotiator might reduce toughness on the person while being tough on the issues in negotiation (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Steinel et al., 2008). Both threats and anger are perceived to be aggressive acts in negotiation, but threats are viewed as relatively less aggressive. Communicating about the likelihood of an impasse or a sanction need not involve negative emotions directed at the recipient. Ideally, a threat could be presented as mere information about the possibility of reaching an impasse (Sinaceur, 2004; Schelling, 1960); for example, it may be framed as a cautionary notice (Tedeschi, 1970). As Kwon and Weingart (2004, p. 272) observed, ultimatums can be presented in a matter-of-fact way, rather than in a hostile way. In general, intimidation may differ from attack (Lytle et al., 1999, p. 35). In sum, a strategy need not rely on communicating aggressive emotions to be effective; communicating a colder message along with the associated perception of a greater sense of confidence and control may be bludgeon enough.

Limitations

A limitation of our experiments is that they did not involve face-to-face interaction. The computer-mediated procedure was ideal for the controlled manipulations of anger and threats and thus allowed us to provide a rigorous first empirical test of our hypotheses. This experimental control resulted in greater internal validity.
as the differences between the conditions existed only in how the counterpart’s reaction was phrased. However, this came at the expense of mundane realism; for example, our manipulation of anger involved only verbal (rather than nonverbal) cues. Hence, caution must be exercised in generalizing from the results. We are reassured by the consistency of prior findings on anger communication in negotiation that used the same computerized procedure as ours (Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007) with those of face-to-face experiments that used both verbal and nonverbal cues of anger (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006) and field studies (Van Kleef et al., 2006). Also, the timing effect we found is consistent with prior negotiation research (e.g., Benton et al., 1972; Moore, 2004; Sinaceur & Neale, 2005; Yukl, 1974a).

However, we should note that the fact that everything in our studies was conveyed in writing via computer might have limited the effectiveness of anger as an emotional strategy compared to threats. It is possible that in face-to-face negotiations, the emotional tone of anger would be relatively more powerful than cold threats. As a first attempt to explore this question, we collected informal, preliminary data in the classroom. We asked 28 economics undergraduates to role-play a two-party, face-to-face negotiation exercise similar to that of Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006, Experiment 2). Specifically, this negotiation exercise was about the terms of a prospective business venture and each pair face to face. Within each pair, one negotiator was advised to use threats (worth 8,000 points). We examined value claiming, which was the percentage of the total points that one party achieved for himself or herself. We found that participants advised to use threats claimed more value ($M = 51.56\%, SD = 5.40\%$) than did participants advised to use anger ($M = 46.38\%, SD = 3.18\%$). $F(1, 13) = 5.25, p = .041, \eta^2 = .30$. These informal, preliminary data make sense to the extent that prior research on anger communication in negotiation usually showed consistent results across procedures. Nonetheless, caution must be exercised in generalizing the results as the data were informal and the sample was quite small. Thus, future research should systematically investigate whether the effect of threats compared to anger generalizes to face-to-face settings. Furthermore, it is important to note that our finding that noise (rather than intensity, appropriateness, agreeableness, or aggressiveness) accounts for the effectiveness of threats relative to anger in eliciting concessions may also be a function of our computerized procedure in which participants were exposed to written rather than verbal communication.

Finally, the current research focused on comparing anger to a cold threat. A question for future research is whether combining anger and threat might be even more effective than issuing a cold threat. On the one hand, it is plausible that anger would add credibility to a cold threat, such that a threat conveyed with anger may be even less easily dismissed than a threat without anger. On the other hand, adding anger might not make a threat more effective insofar as the effectiveness of anger already lies in conveying an implied threat. Future research is needed to settle this empirical question.

### Conclusion

To conclude, three experiments disentangled the effects of communicating anger from communicating threat in negotiations. Experiment 1 showed that the reason why anger communication (vs. a control) elicits concessions is that it conveys an implied threat. Drawing from that, Experiments 2–3 made a direct comparison of anger and threat and showed that (a) a direct threat was even more effective than anger in eliciting concessions and (b) this relative difference between threat and anger was mediated by recipients’ ascribing more poise to a threatening counterpart than to an angry one. Thus, a cold strategy can be more effective than an emotional strategy, a conclusion that qualifies prior research on anger communication and has important implications for an understanding of the dynamics of emotions, relationships, and concessions in negotiations. Calmly issuing a threat makes it clear that there is more effective than getting angry. This suggests that getting angry may be unnecessary.

### References


from http://www.comm.ohio-state.edu/ahayes/SPSS%20programs/indirect.htm


