The Problem of the Algorithm_Heuristic Distinction in Learning Social Skills

Abstract

In learning social skills, we build pattern and relational recognition (or what psychologists, chess players, athletes, cops, et. al. refer to as ïinstinctÍ, ïintuitionÍ, or ïgut-feelingÍ). This relational-pattern recognition dimension of social interaction learns how to key the definition of the situation. The data the cognitive heuristic learns from are the various configurations of nonverbal cues, verbal cues and the immediate social action that follows from the interaction of the nonverbal and verbal configurations. One of the most important configurations that oneÍs heuristic relational-pattern recognition must learn is keying whether the definition of the situation is characteristically formal or informal. It is this attribution that feeds back for the next move or subsequent expression game of the encounter. In determining the social action that will occur in the ongoing social interaction, oneÍs heuristic relational-pattern recognition relies on this formal or informal characterization to determine whether to resort to learned/past heuristics or learned/past algorithms of social action. This poster will show how this distinction is problematic for formally learning social skills.