The
China Syndrome
Dispelling the mysteries and fears around an emerging power
By Suzanne Ogden
Ask a group of Americans what comes to mind when
they think of China, and most will say Tiananmen Square.
It’s not a surprising response. The 1989 Beijing
demonstrations and the Chinese government’s crackdown, much of it
vividly captured by television cameras, helped crystallize popular
opinion in America about China. In the years since, a steady drumbeat
of negative stories from human rights groups and the international
press have only solidified the disapproving view.
At best, China is portrayed as a vigorous economy.
Yet even this is turned into a negative, with some observers suggesting
China’s strength could ultimately threaten the U.S. position in
the world economy. Others worry China could convert its economic
power into military might, and use it offensively.
Then there’s the ideology problem. China is ruled
by the Communist Party, and most Americans, with anti-Communism
anxieties still running deep, assume the government in China is
a replica of the former Soviet Union’s.
As a China specialist who travels to that country
regularly, I believed that Americans’ misconceptions and fears were
preventing them from understanding what a vibrant society China
has become over the last twenty years, and that critics were comparing
China to an “ideal” legal and political system, a standard even
liberal democracies fail to live up to.
So I wrote Inklings of Democracy in China (Harvard
University Press, 2002) to examine emerging surfaces within the
country: Its expansion of social, economic, civil, and political
rights. The competing ideas and values held by its citizens. The
proliferation of associations and interest groups. The increasingly
autonomous and assertive national legislature. The growing number
of truly democratic elections in the country’s 930,000 villages.
The development of a more equitable legal system. And the broad
progress China has made toward providing a better life for its people.
Clearly, China is a more complex and pluralistic
society than most Americans realize. But when we think about China’s
present and future, are we right to see its authoritarian rule as
a “problem,” and greater democratization the surest “cure”?
To evaluate the effectiveness of any form of government
fairly, we need consistent standards that help us get beyond the
potentially misleading labels “authoritarian” and “democratic.”
The Human Development Index (HDI), developed by the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP), offers one method of assessing a government’s
success.
Simply stated, the HDI looks at quality of life
within a country, and the willingness and ability of a government
to address the developmental needs of its citizens. According to
the index’s goals, it measures “average achievement in three basic
dimensions of human development—a long and healthy life, knowledge,
and a decent standard of living.” Out of the 175 countries ranked
by the HDI in 2003, the United States placed 7th, and China 104th.
But if we compare China with, say, India, we see
that development may depend far more on a government’s objectives,
values, and competence than its form. Like China, India is a developing
country with a population of more than a billion people, and it
achieved independence from the British around the same time China
came under Communist Party rule. Yet India, which has had a democratic
system since 1947, ranks only 127th in the 2003 HDI.
To date, democratic India hasn’t produced a government
willing to address the problems of its people. Indian officials
encourage grain production through hefty subsidies to farmers, but
the surplus grain rots in the fields, and malnutrition among Indian
citizens remains at unconscionably high levels. Nor has India done
anything to control its soaring population growth or abolish the
caste system in practice.
According to UNDP data, as of 1998 the adult (age
fifteen and over) illiteracy rate was 44.3 percent in India, 17.2
percent in China. The mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) for
those under age five was 105 in India, 47 in China. Can we say with
any certainty that Indian democracy has fulfilled the social and
economic rights of its people better than China’s authoritarianism?
Does the average Indian citizen have more human dignity or legal
protection than the average Chinese citizen?
In reality, meaningful reforms can occur under
any form of government, and democratic governments may be no more
willing to undertake reform than authoritarian ones (as the Japanese
government’s reluctance to make financial reforms demonstrates all
too clearly).
Ironically, as China moves toward democratic reforms—allowing
its citizens greater freedom and political participation—it may
be moving too quickly, not too slowly, undermining conditions that
have created a civil society for the Chinese people.
Likewise, socioeconomic forces that enhance democratic
progress in China have had negative effects, especially for a significant
percentage of peasants and workers—the very groups for whom the
Communist revolution was fought in 1949. Unemployment, the loss
of a social safety net, and the polarization of wealth have been
the high costs of promoting a market economy.
China’s democratic development, then, will depend
on whether the state can maintain social and economic stability
by finding the proper balance between granting autonomy and maintaining
control. Singapore, Taiwan, and Japan prove that polities can and
do live with such tensions. Continuing development raises another
issue: What should democracy in China look like? There is currently
no consensus here, either in the West or among Chinese dissidents
and intellectuals. When China’s liberals can’t agree on something
as fundamental as “one person, one vote,” where does China begin?
Consider just the challenges posed by legal and
judicial reform. China needs to decide what “justice” means in practice.
How its judicial system should implement equality before the law.
Which body, the National People’s Congress or the Supreme Judicial
Court, should be the final arbiter of a law’s legality. Whether
high-court judges should be appointed by political leaders, and,
if so, what kind of political and judicial views appointees should
have.
Most of China’s legal scholars are far from being
Communist Party toadies; they are committed to the rule of law for
China. Many have been trained in the West, and many Western lawyers
and faculty—even U.S. Supreme Court justices—have been invited to
China to help them think about the best way to reform the legal
system. The fundamental questions China’s experts are struggling
with crop up regularly in any democratic system, including our own,
and the answers keep changing.
America doesn’t enjoy the moral high ground to
stand in judgment of China’s government. Overall, if the Chinese
people prefer economic growth, which they believe requires stability,
to political democratization, which they believe could be quite
destabilizing, who are Americans to say otherwise? We’ve never experienced
the degree of political and social upheaval they have lived through.
And if the Chinese people don’t completely believe
in the healing power of democracy, who can blame them? They see
the disorder that has plagued Russia and the former Soviet republics,
not to mention the rapid growth Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and
South Korea have achieved under more authoritarian systems. A strong,
stable, and developing China is in everyone’s best interests, including
those of the United States.
The truth is, China faces a lot of difficult challenges,
and democratization, if it comes, won’t be a simple or easy cure.
Suzanne Ogden, a professor in the Department
of Political Science, is also a research associate at Harvard
University’s Fairbank Center
for East Asian Research.
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