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Illustration By Jeffrey Smith

"The Presidential Nomination Process Reconsidered: The End of Momentum?"

 

Political science professor William Mayer's speech to the university, February 21, 2000

 

Over the last several weeks, the speech that I'm going to give today has gone through what are probably best described as several major mood swings. When Chris first approached me several months ago about giving the Presidents' Day Address, I thought it would be a good opportunity to bring together some thoughts I have had about how the presidential selection system has changed in recent years and how those changes may force us to revise some of the things we thought we knew about presidential politics.

And then, just as this speech was taking shape, along came John McCain. When McCain clobbered George Bush so badly in the New Hampshire primary, he not only derailed the Republican front-runner and sharply energized his own campaign; he also threatened, in a number of ways, to give the lie to much of what I was planning to say today.

In response, I drafted a considerably more cautious, even apologetic speech-only to have George Bush post a substantial win in the South Carolina primary just two days ago. So I'm now back to being my usual reckless, obstreperous self.

Actually, I've long believed, for a complex variety of reasons, that generalizations in the social sciences will never have the rigid, lawlike quality of those in physics or chemistry. In that sense, no one presidential nomination race can provide a final, definitive test of the ideas and theories I'll be presenting here. This caveat stated upfront, what I hope to do over the next 40 minutes is to lay out a general view of how the American presidential nomination process has evolved over the last thirty years and how it operates in most cases. I will then, in my concluding remarks, talk specifically about the 2000 race and how it might illustrate, qualify, or disprove my theory.

The take-off point for my analysis is with the presidential campaign of 1976-more precisely, with the Democratic nomination race of that year. 1976 is an apt starting point for several reasons. As most of you probably know, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the basic rules of the presidential nomination process were almost entirely rewritten. The first wave of changes originated in the Democratic Party. In response to the very bitter and chaotic Democratic national convention of 1968, the Democrats created a special commission to re-examine their party's rules: the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, more commonly known as the McGovern-Fraser Commission, after the two men who served as its chairmen. That commission had a rather vague mandate, and there is abundant evidence that many of the people who voted to create it had no clear idea as to exactly what it was they were authorizing. But that scarcely seems to have troubled the commission. In just four years, the McGovern-Fraser Commission managed to put together a comprehensive set of recommendations that entirely recast the rules for selecting delegates, and then compelled fifty different state parties to abide by their provisions. The result has been described by one political scientist as "the greatest systematic change in presidential nomination procedures in all of American history."

Indeed, there is evidence that the work of the McGovern-Fraser Commission also had an important effect on the operations of the Republican Party. This came about partly because the Democratic party reformers helped promulgate new standards of openness and participation that the Republicans felt compelled to emulate, partly because when Democratic state legislatures changed their laws to correspond to the Democrats' new national rules, they usually applied the new provisions to the Republicans as well. Whatever the precise reasons, the Republican nomination process also changed quite dramatically during these years. As the number of presidential primaries increased, for example, it rose just as fast in the Republican party as in the Democratic.

The ink was barely dry on the McGovern-Fraser Commission's final report when the nomination process was rocked by a second major set of changes. In 1974, in response to the Watergate scandals, Congress passed a law-technically, a set of amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971-that completely restructured the ways that candidates could raise and spend money while running for president. This law, with only a few modifications, is still in effect. It has lots of critics; but no one I know of denies that it is an important landmark in American electoral history.

The first election cycle to which both sets of rules applied was, of course, 1976. And though both parties had contested nomination races that year, it was the Democratic race that received most of the attention afterward and that did most to shape the view of the new nomination process that came to be held by practitioners, journalists, and scholars alike.

The story of the 1976 Democratic nomination race is a long and complicated one. I won't be able to do it full justice here, but in order to appreciate its impact, a certain amount of detail is essential. When the 1976 campaign began, Jimmy Carter was an extraordinary long-shot to win his party's nomination. His previous political experience consisted of four years in the Georgia state senate and a single, four-year term as Georgia's governor. While not an obvious failure in that position, neither was he a conspicuous success. If you had made a list in the early 1970s of governors who were particularly well-regarded by their peers or by those national political reporters who paid attention to such matters, Carter's name would probably not have been on that list.

Partly as a consequence, Carter was very little known outside of his home state. When national Democratic party identifiers were asked whom they preferred for their party's nomination, throughout 1975, only 1 or 2 percent named Carter. Perhaps the ultimate demonstration of Carter's national obscurity during this period came when he appeared on a nationally televised game show called "What's My Line?" For those of you who are unfamiliar with this particular milestone in American culture, the contestants on "What's My Line?" were typically people with obscure or unusual occupations. A panel of celebrities was allowed to ask a certain number of yes-and-no questions of each contestant, with the object being to guess what it was that he or she actually did. In late 1974, Jimmy Carter actually appeared as a contestant on this show-and none of the panelists was able to figure out who he was!

Nor did Carter have much support among Democratic party leaders or Democratically-aligned interest groups. As the first Georgia governor who officially opposed segregation, Carter did have strong ties to an important set of civil rights leaders, including Martin Luther King, Sr., and Andrew Young. But with that notable exception, the major power centers in the Democratic Party did not show much enthusiasm for Carter until after he had already won a long string of primaries and become the clear front-runner. Senators, governors, state party chairs, labor unions, feminists, environmentalists, liberal intellectuals-none of these groups were strong early supporters of Jimmy Carter's presidential bid.

By early 1976, Carter had begun to attract a certain amount of attention among hard-core political junkies-national political reporters and commentators, political consultants, and so forth-but was still almost entirely unknown to the general American public. In the final Gallup poll taken before the Iowa caucuses, just 4 percent of the nation's Democrats supported Carter as their party's presidential candidate.

But Carter did have at least two important assets in his quest for the White House: he had plenty of time to campaign (having left the Georgia governship in 1974, he was effectively unemployed); and he had a very prescient, well-devised campaign strategy. The Carter strategy-most of it actually came out of a remarkable memo written by a young Carter aide named Hamilton Jordan-was based on four major premises:

First, the Carter campaign understood from the very beginning that not all primaries and caucuses are created equal. The events at the very start of the nomination calendar-the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary-would receive substantially more attention from the press and, thus, from both political elites and the mass public.

Second, the campaign in Iowa and New Hampshire was, to a great extent, separate from the national campaign. In particular, given the small number of voters who were likely to participate in these events, it was possible for a candidate to spend a great deal of time personally campaigning in these states and gradually build up a substantial base of support, even though his ratings in the national polls were stagnant.

Third, given the necessity of doing a lot of personal campaigning in Iowa and New Hampshire, Carter had to announce early. In fact, he formally entered the race on December 12, 1974.

Finally, Carter hoped that strong showings in Iowa and New Hampshire would provide his campaign with additional money, publicity, and support-in short, with momentum-and thus make him a formidable contender in later primaries.

So that was the Carter strategy-and remarkably enough, it actually worked. Carter began the 1976 nomination season by winning both Iowa and New Hampshire. He won Iowa largely because he had spent a lot of time campaigning there-and because none of the other major candidates recognized until quite late in the game that Iowa would be an important contest. He won New Hampshire partly because he had campaigned a lot there as well, partly because of his victory in Iowa, and partly because he was the only conservative running against a field of four liberals.

And then it was off to the races. Carter's victory in New Hampshire put him on the cover of both Time and Newsweek. His support in the national polls immediately jumped from 4 percent to 16 percent. Two weeks after New Hampshire, Carter faced his next major test: He needed to show that he could beat George Wallace in the South. For a variety of reasons, including the fact that Florida is, in many ways, an atypical southern state, Carter did win that primary, 34 percent to 30 percent. Several days later, according to Gallup, 26 percent of the nation's Democrats wanted him as their presidential candidate.

With momentum clearly behind him, from mid-March through early May, Carter won an almost uninterrupted string of primaries all across the country. His record was somewhat less impressive after that: between mid-May and early June, Carter actually lost more primaries than he won. But for his opponents, it was too little too late. By the night of June 8, when the final set of primaries had concluded, Carter was close to having clinched a majority of the delegates and most of his opponents were withdrawing from the race. In the space of just six months, Carter had gone from non-entity to all-but-certain nominee.

Besides elevating Carter to the White House, the 1976 campaign had a number of important, long-term effects on American presidential politics. Simply put, the 1976 Carter campaign strategy became the prototype, the template, for almost every subsequent presidential campaign. How do you win a presidential nomination? Almost every candidate since 1976 has felt compelled to emulate the four major premises of the Carter campaign: announce early, target Iowa and New Hampshire, do a lot of personal campaigning in those states, and then try to ride a wave of momentum to the nomination. As one Democratic strategist would comment in 1986, "Now there is only one strategy. It doesn't matter whether you are a Walter Mondale with deep ties to the party or whether you are a newcomer-you both do the same things."

Equally important for our purposes, the 1976 campaign had an enormous impact on the way that political commentators and political scientists viewed the presidential selection process. In the first place, it was the 1976 race that first established "momentum" as the great buzzword, the crucial concept, in understanding and interpreting a presidential nomination race. No election since then has run its course without a host of articles and reports speculating about which candidate has the momentum and how that may change in response to the most recent set of primary or caucus results.

What exactly is momentum? A good working definition is that momentum is the effect of previous primary and caucus results on subsequent primaries and caucuses. Put another way, momentum points out the most important way that presidential primaries differ from almost every other type of election. Other elections-in particular, the general elections that are held every second November-are held at the same time on a single day. We all go into voting booth with roughly the same set of facts and expectations, the same reading of the national political situation. But presidential primaries occur sequentially, spread out over a period of several months. When the voters in Massachusetts go to the polls on March 7, for example, they will know about the verdicts already rendered by the voters in Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Michigan. And, not surprisingly, these early results may have a great effect on how Massachusetts residents think about the race and, especially, on how they actually cast their votes.

On a second level, the 1976 results seemed to indicate that the United States had somehow created a presidential selection system that was unusually favorable to outsider and long-shot candidates. As a result of changes in the Democratic and Republican party rules, state and local party leaders were stripped of whatever formal powers they had had over the selection of national convention delegates. Almost all delegates were now chosen in caucuses and primaries that were open to essentially any voter who wanted to participate. No longer, in short, did a presidential candidate require the support or permission of the established party leadership.

And if the Carter strategy was the way to win the White House, that only made matters worse. By requiring an early announcement date and large quantities of personal campaign time, the new system seemed to give a distinct advantage to candidates who were currently unemployed or, at least, not tied down by significant governing responsibilities. As an aide to one of Carter's leading rivals would later declare, "I've learned something. You can't do your job in Congress and run for President." Put another way, the presidential nomination process appeared to disadvantage a party's major congressional leaders and its incumbent, big-state governors, who were likely to be too busy to run for president.

The prominence of Iowa and New Hampshire further leveled the playing field. New Hampshire is one of the smallest states in the union, both geographically and in terms of population. Iowa is somewhat larger, but because it uses a caucus system to select its delegates, turnout rarely exceeds 10 or 15 percent of the electorate. In both states, then, candidates are playing before what must be considered, in presidential terms, a remarkably small audience. Breakthrough victories can be (and have been) achieved with 30,000 or 40,000 votes. All of which effectively neutralized many of the advantages-such as money and name recognition-that front-runners might have enjoyed if the process had started out in a larger venue.

To summarize the argument so far: Between 1969 and 1974, the basic rules of the American presidential nomination process were almost entirely rewritten. What was the new system like? How did it work? The experience of 1976, particularly on the Democratic side, suggested two important conclusions. First, the system appeared to be unusually favorable to long-shot and outsider candidates, and notably antagonistic to the ambitions of established party leaders and front-runners. Second, most of the nomination season seemed to be dominated by the search for an elusive quality known as momentum. To a remarkable (and distressing) extent, one of the best predictors of how well a candidate would fare in any particular primary was how well he had done in past primaries.

As anyone familar with the literature on this topic will testify, both of these generalizations exerted an enormous and continuing influence on the way that scholars and journalists view the presidential nomination process. The problem is that neither generalization holds up as a description of the way that the nomination process actually functioned after 1976.

Let us start with the second of these two propositions: Has the presidential nomination process been favorable to outsiders and long-shots? Has it been a graveyard for front-runners? In order to answer this question systematically, we need some relatively objective way of determining who the front-runner in each race was and who deserves to be classified as a long-shot. Two indicators are, I think, especially well-suited to this purpose; and in case my opening comments have smudged my credentials as a social scientist, I've even brought some data along.

The first of these indicators is the candidates' relative standing in national polls of party identifiers. As I've already suggested, for at least a year before the first real delegates are chosen, pollsters ask national samples of Democrats and Republicans whom they would like to see nominated as their party's candidate for president. For every contested presidential nomination race from 1980 through the present, the first page of the handout shows how the candidates ranked in the last Gallup poll conducted before the start of delegate selection activities: that is to say, the last poll before the Iowa caucuses.

The point of these numbers should be clear: in seven out of the last eight contested nomination races, the candidate who was ahead in the polls when the process started went on to win the nomination. The only occasion when the national polls didn't predict the winner was the Democratic nomination race of 1988. As you may recall, Colorado Senator Gary Hart was the early front-runner for the 1988 Democratic presidential nomination-until the Miami Herald reported, in May of 1987, that Hart had spent a night in his Washington, D.C. townhouse with, as many reporters delicately put it, "a woman not his wife." Several days after these revelations, Hart withdrew from the contest-but then rejoined the field in December. This late re-entry muddied the race at just the time when the competition was heating up and the other candidates were trying to break out of the pack. The upshot, I think it fair to say, is that, at least according to the survey evidence, there was no clear front-runner for the 1988 Democratic nomination contest. Hart was the leading candidate in the final Gallup poll before Iowa, but he had the support of less than a quarter of the nation's Democrats, and was only narrowly ahead of Michael Dukakis and Jesse Jackson. At the time these polls were released, moreover, I think it was widely recognized that the results were misleading, that Hart's lead was the product of little more than name recognition, and that this lead would evaporate as soon as the primaries and caucuses began. So it is no exaggeration to say that, every time since 1976 when there has been a clear front-runner in the national polls, that candidate has gone on to win the nomination.

As the 1988 Democratic race suggests, however, national poll results, taken in isolation, aren't always a perfect measure of how a particular race is shaping up and who the front-runners and long-shots are. So let's look at a second indicator: the candidates' relative success in raising campaign money. As you probably know, since the passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments in 1974, all presidential candidates have been required to release periodic reports detailing how much money they have raised and spent in seeking their party's nomination. The second table in the handout shows the total amount of money that each candidate had raised by the end of the year before the election. (The figures for 2000, for example, report the candidates' fund-raising totals as of December 31, 1999.)

I do not present these data because I believe that money can buy a presidential nomination: to the contrary, a close look at this table shows a number of examples of candidates who were very good at raising money, but then failed miserably once the primaries began. Instead, as I've already suggested, I treat these fund-raising figures as another way of handicapping the race. On the one hand, money clearly is a useful resource in a presidential campaign, even if it doesn't completely determine the final outcome. Equally important, the money chase provides valuable information about how other elites view the race. People give money to presidential candidates for a variety of reasons, but as a general rule, any aspirant to the White House who wants to amass a sizable war chest must convince a quite large number of potential contributors that he is a viable candidate, that he has at least some chance of gaining the nomination.

Viewed in this light, the fund-raising totals shown here-and again I stress that these figures show how the race was shaping up before a single vote had been cast or a single delegate selected-turn out to be a very accurate predictor of who eventually wins a presidential nomination race. Specifically, they forecast the winner in seven of the eight contested races since 1980.

So as a simple matter of historical description, the contemporary presidential nomination race has not been a favorable arena for outsiders and long-shots. As these tables clearly indicate, over the last two decades presidential nominations have almost always gone to the pre-nomination front-runner. Nothing like the Carter candidacy of 1976 has occurred in any race since then.

If front-runners always always win, that also suggests that momentum is a much less important factor than is commonly supposed. To be more precise, momentum, in my view, helps explain all of the secondary features of a presidential nomination race. If you want to know why Gary Hart came in second in the 1984 Democratic contest, if you want to know why all the opposition to Bob Dole effectively collapsed right after his victory in the 1996 South Carolina primary, if you want to know why John McCain's standing in the polls took a dramatic leap upward immediately after he won in New Hampshire, the best single explanation is clearly that all of these represent the effects of momentum.

What momentum doesn't do much to explain, however, is the one fact we all care most about: namely, who finally wins the nomination. On this score, momentum may reasonably be compared to a roller-coaster ride: it provides lots of exciting ups and downs, but when the ride finally ends, we usually wind up exactly where we started out.

Why has this been the case? Why has a system that was once believed to be favorable to long-shots and outsiders turned out to be so dominated by established front-runners? There are, I believe, two major reasons why the long-term tendencies of the contemporary nomination process have been so different from what we initially expected. To begin with, candidates and campaign strategists have simply learned a lot more about how the process works. They have seen it in operation a number of times, they understand its basic imperatives, and it is, therefore, much more difficult for one candidate to gain a decisive strategic advantage over the rest of the field.

To appreciate the point I'm making here, it's important to remember the historical context of the 1976 campaign. With the rules of the process so completely rewritten, the 1976 election was held in an atmosphere of great strategic uncertainty. It was by no means obvious how the system would work in practice or what it would require the candidates to do. As it turned out, Carter and his top aides did understand the basic dynamics and necessities of the new system. In important ways, all of his major opponents did not.

Consider two examples:

1. One important prong of Carter's strategy was to launch his campaign early, to give the candidate ample time to campaign and organize intensively, particularly in the early primary and caucus states. Today, early announcement dates are taken as a fact of life in presidential politics-but this was definitely not the case in 1976. Two of Carter's stronger potential opponents didn't announce their campaigns until late in 1975; two others waited until March of 1976, almost two months after the Iowa caucuses.

2. Another part of the Carter game plan was to give special attention to New Hampshire, then as now the site of the nation's first primary. Today, of course, most of us take such a step for granted-but it was not obvious to everyone in 1976. Indeed, one of the major reasons why Carter won in New Hampshire was that two of his strongest competitors, Henry Jackson and George Wallace, both decided to skip the Granite State entirely.

But the kind of strategic advantage that Carter enjoyed in 1976 was bound to be temporary. It might hold up for one or two runs through the cycle, but after a while, the effects of the new rules would start to become clearer, the strategy that worked the last time would be carefully studied and copied, and a "conventional wisdom" about the nature of the process would gradually begin to emerge. There has been, in short, a perceptible convergence in candidate strategies. By 1980-1984 at the latest-almost all candidates were using some variant of the basic Carter strategy from 1976.

Most significantly, the strategy was adopted by front-running candidates, thus neutralizing one of the major advantages that the process supposedly gave to outsider and long-shot candidates. Through most of the last twelve months, Bill Bradley spent a great deal of time and money seeking support in Iowa and New Hampshire. So why didn't he do better in either locale? Because Al Gore, the Democratic front-runner, matched him dollar for dollar and town meeting for town meeting. Similarly with George W. Bush. While I will offer a number of criticisms of the Bush campaign later in this speech, one cannot legitimately say that he ignored Iowa or New Hampshire: To the contrary, he committed a lot of time and money to both states. And the more that the front-runners target Iowa and New Hampshire, the harder it becomes for a long-shot to do well there.

A second development that has worked to the advantage of front-runners is the increasingly front-loaded nature of the primary and caucus calendar. The basic dimensions of this trend are probably familiar to most of you. When Jimmy Carter ran for president in 1976, the schedule of primaries and caucuses started up quite slowly. It began, as I've already said, with the Iowa caucuses, which were held on January 19. The next major event didn't take